Internet-Draft QUIC BDP Tokens March 2024
Misell Expires 5 September 2024 [Page]
Workgroup:
QUIC
Internet-Draft:
draft-misell-quic-ex-token-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
Q. Misell
AS207960

Extensible Address Validation Tokens for QUIC

Abstract

This document describes a method to extend QUIC address validation tokens to include structured data that a client can parse and make use of. The initial application envisioned in this document is signalling congestion control parameters for use with Careful Resume.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document defines a method to extend QUIC address validation tokens to have structure, so that a client can parse them, and optionally make use of additional information within the token, depending on the nature of the extensions in use.

The initial application for this is envisioned to be allowing a QUIC server to send calculated Congestion Control parameters to a client for storage and later use on a future connection with Careful Resume [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-careful-resume].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP14] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Extensible Tokens

QUIC [RFC9000] defines an address validation token as an opaque blob that the client should not inspect. This document extends this by providing structure to the token, allowing arbitrary fields to be defined on the token by this and future documents.

A QUIC client unaware of this document will still be able to make use of extensible tokens without modification, although it will do nothing but pass the entire token back to the server unmodified.

The format of an extensible token is defined as follows:

BDP Token {
    Address Validation Length (i),
    Address Validation (..),
    Extension ID (i),
    Extension Data Length (i),
    Extension Data (..),
    ...
}
Figure 1: Extensible Token

The fields are as follows:

Address Validation Length
A variable-length integer specifying the length of the Address Validation field, in bytes. A value of 0 indicates that the server is not using address validation and is using the token purely for extensible information.
Address Validation
Opaque information specific to the server that it will use for address validation. The construction of this field MUST comply with the requirements of [RFC9000] section 8.1.
Extension ID
A variable-length integer specifying the ID of the extension. The registry for these IDs is defined in the IANA Considerations section of this document.
Extension Data Length
A variable-length integer specifying the length of the Extension Data field, in bytes.
Extension Data
A byte field containing the data for the extension.

Extension ID, Extension Data Length, and Extension Data can be repeated as many times as needed to include desired extensions. Extension IDs MUST NOT appear multiple times in a token.

2.1. Extensible token signalling

The server can send extended tokens to all clients without further negotiation. However a client needs some way to know that there is meaningful structure to a token its received from the server. To this end a new transport parameter is defined.

ex_token (04143414213370002)
The ex_token transport parameter is a boolean value that indicates that the server is using extensible tokens. It can have the following values:
- 0, default value: Extensible Tokens are not in use.
- 1: Extensible Tokens are in use.

2.2. Invalid Extensible tokens

If the server is unable to decode the token received from the client, or vise versa, this MUST be treated as the connection error EX_TOKEN_ERROR (0x4143414213370002).

2.3. Extension design

As an extensible token is designed to be presented to clients that may not be aware of what an extensible token is, all extensions defined for extensible tokens MUST be designed such that it can handle its data being echoed back to the server unmodified on a future connection.

3. BDP Tokens

This document defines the BDP_TOKEN extension, designed to Congestion Control information for use in Careful Resume [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-careful-resume].

The format of a token extension containing BDP information is defined as follows:

BDP Token {
    Private Data Length (i),
    Private Data (..),
    Capacity (i),
    RTT (i),
    Requested Capacity (i),
}
Figure 2: BDP Token

The fields are as follows:

Private Data Length
A variable-length integer specifying the length of the Private Data field, in bytes. A value of 0 indicates that the server does not intend to store Congestion Control data on the client, and that the Capacity and RTT fields are merely informative.
Private Data
Opaque information specific to the server that it will use to prime its congestion controller state. This field SHOULD contain expiration/lifetime information, and any additional information that the server may need to validate that the same path is being used, such as an endpoint token as defined in Careful Resume [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-careful-resume]. The data MUST be signed, or otherwise protected against modification by the client. If the data contains information that could potentially be used to fingerprint the client, it MUST be encrypted, or otherwise protected against inspection by wire observers. An example method for protecting the Private Data field is provided in Appendix A.
Capacity
The estimated capacity of the path in bytes (congestion window), encoded as a variable-length integer.
RTT
The RTT of the path in microseconds, encoded as a variable-length integer.
Requested capacity
In a token sent by the server, this field is set to the same value as the Capacity field. If the client becomes aware of a change in the available bandwidth of the path, it can adjust this field to request a lower capacity be used by the server when priming its congestion controller state.

3.1. Client interaction

If the client becomes aware of a change in the available bandwidth of the path, it can use the Requested Capacity field to signal to the server a change it its available bandwidth. The server MUST not accept a value higher than that of the Capacity field, as this could cause an overload of the network path.

If the client sets the Requested Bandwidth field to 0 then it is signalling that the server should not attempt to prime its congestion controller from previous state and should instead treat this connection as an entirely new congestion control context.

3.2. Invalid BDP tokens

If a server or client is unable to decode the token received as a valid BDP token then this MUST be treated as a connection error BDP_TOKEN_ERROR (0x4143414213370003). A token which is merely expired MUST NOT trigger a connection error, instead it should be silently discarded.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. QUIC Transport Parameters

Per this document, one new entry has been added to the "QUIC Transport Parameters" registry defined in [RFC9000] section 22.3. This entry is defined below:

Table 1: New Transport Parameter entries
Value Status Specification Parameter name
0x41434142 13370002 Provisional This document ex_token

4.2. QUIC Transport Error Codes

Per this document, two new entries have been added to the "QUIC Transport Error Codes" registry defined in [RFC9000] section 22.5. This entry is defined below:

Table 2: New Transport Error Code entries
Value Status Code Description Specification
0x41434142 13370002 Provisional EX_TOKEN_ERROR The extensible token received is invalid. This document
0x41434142 13370003 Provisional BDP_TOKEN_ERROR The BDP token received is invalid. This document

4.3. QUIC Extensible Token Extension IDs

Per this document, a new registry for "QUIC Extensible Token Extension IDs" is created under the "QUIC" heading defined in [RFC9000] section 22.

In addition to the fields listed in [RFC9000] section 22.1.1, permanent registrations in this registry MUST include the following field:

Extension name
A short mnemonic for the extension type.
Table 3: Initial QUIC Extensible Token Extension IDs Entries
Value Extension name Specification
0x01 BDP_TOKEN Section 3

Each value of the form 31 * N + 26 for integer values of N (that is, 26, 57, 88, ...) are reserved for private use; these values are to be treated as opaque blobs meaningful only to the server operator.

Each value of the form 31 * N + 27 for integer values of N (that is, 27, 58, 89, ...) are reserved; these values MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values.

5. Security Considerations

The Congestion Control data MUST be protected against manipulation by malicious or mis-behaving clients. A client that can modify Congestion Control data could cause an overload of the network path.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[BCP14]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, .
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, .
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp14>
[RFC9000]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

6.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-careful-resume]
Kuhn, N., Emile, S., Fairhurst, G., Secchi, R., and C. Huitema, "Convergence of Congestion Control from Retained State", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-careful-resume-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-careful-resume-07>.
[RFC8439]
Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols", RFC 8439, DOI 10.17487/RFC8439, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439>.

Appendix A. Example method for protecting the BDP Token's Private Data Field

This section is non-normative.

Consider the following private data structure:

Private Data {
    IP Address (16 bytes),
    Expiry Timestamp (8 bytes)
}
Figure 3: BDP Private Data

This structure contains information that could be used to track a client (its previous IP address), and therefore MUST be protected from inspection by wire observers. Additionally the Capacity and RTT fields MUST be protected from modification by a client.

To this end this example uses the ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439] cipher with additional data. The ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher encrypts data, and protects the encrypted data as well as additional unencrypted data against modification.

The additional data has the following structure:

Additional Data {
    Saved Capacity (8 bytes),
    Saved RTT (16 bytes)
}
Figure 4: BDP Additional Data

After encryption the 12 byte nonce is appended to the Private Data structure to allow the encryption to be reversed when the token is later used.

Author's Address

Q Misell
AS207960 Cyfyngedig
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